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COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
SYSTEMS: A RECOGNITION OF
COMPETING INTERESTS
AN INTRODUCTION
LAWRENCE J. BEASERt

The purpose of this symposium is to discuss whether certain
types of information should be computerized in a large, automated
criminal justice information system which is intended to provide
data to a number of criminal justice agencies. To the extent that
specific categories of data are discussed, the participants have been
asked to focus on the computerization of three such categories:
information of arrests both that do and do not result in conviction;
personal history information; and medical history information. Also
to be discussed are the competing interests which are affected by any
such computerization.
This symposium concerns only information gathered by criminal justice agencies. By this is meant either a court or other
government agency which as its principal function, "performs the
administration of criminal justice."1 Thus the term includes not only
the police and the courts, but also prison systems, probation and
2
parole systems, district attorneys, and so on.

t Counsel to the Governor, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Member, Governor's Task Force on Criminal Justice Information Systems. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1967; J.D., Harvard University, 1970.
1. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration [hereinafter cited as LEAA]
Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 20.1-.38 (1976), define the term "criminal justice agency" to
mean "(1) courts; (2) a government agency or any subunit thereof which performs the
administration of criminal justice pursuant to a statute or executive order, and which
allocates a substantial part of its annual budget to the administration of criminal
justice." 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(c) (1976). Also, "administration of criminal justice" is defined
to mean
performance of any of the following activities: detection, apprehension,
detention, pretrial release, post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons or criminal offenders.
The administration of criminal justice shall include criminal identification
activiies and the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal history record
information.
Id. § 20.3(d) (1976).
2. Compare the definition of "criminal justice agency" contained in the LEAA
Regulations, supra note 1, with the definition of "criminal justice agency" contained
in the Dictionary of Criminal Justice Data Terminology, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, Nat'l Criminal Justice Information and
Statistics Service, First Edition 1976, which was prepared for LEAA by SEARCH
Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal.:
Any court with criminal jurisdiction and any other government agency or
subunit, which defends indigents, or of which the principal functions or activities
consist of the prevention, detection and investigation of crime; the apprehension,
detention and prosecution of alleged offenders; the confinement or official
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Moreover, only computerized information systems designed to
link together a number of criminal justice agencies are being
discussed. In the interest of time and simplicity, this symposium is
not directly addressing specific problems created by record keeping
within one criminal justice agency, except to the extent that the
issues are the same as must be faced with regard to a larger,
multiagency computerized criminal justice information system.
Finally, manually maintained records are not being discussed.
The focus of this symposium is only on automated criminal justice
3
information systems.
In Pennsylvania, a discussion limited to automated systems
eliminates from consideration criminal justice information systems
maintained at present by the state government. The Governor's
Task Force on Criminal Justice Information Systems 4 has decided
that the Commonwealth will not computerize the Pennsylvania
State Police's criminal history records. In November of 1976,
Lieutenant Governor Kline testified before the Pennsylvania House
Appropriations and Judiciary Committees that Pennsylvania did
not maintain a centralized computer history file nor did it
5
contemplate resort to one in the future.
Such a computerized criminal justice information system does
exist in Philadelphia. The original scope of the Philadelphia Justice
Information System (PJIS) was to collect and disseminate, by
computer, all the information that the various Philadelphia criminal
justice agencies would need to accomplish their functions.6 However,
the guidelines promulgated for PJIS strictly limit the types of
7
information which may be placed in the PJIS computer.

correctional supervision of accused or convicted persons, or the administrative or
technical support of the above functions.
Id. The agency for whom information is being collected and to whom information will
be disseminated is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether the
"computerization burden," discussed in the text accompanying notes 27-31, infra has
been met.
3. The automated criminal justice information system being discussed here is
not necessarily equivalent to a "criminal history record information system," which is
the subject of the LEAA Regulations. See 28 C.F.R. §20.3(a) (1976). One of the
questions for discussion at this symposium is whether computerized data should be
limited to some or all "criminal history record information" as defined in 28 C.F.R.
§ 20.3(b) (1976).
4. The Governor's Task Force on Criminal Justice Information Systems was
established by Pennsylvania Executive Order No. 1975-10, 4 Pa. Code §5.41-.47
(1975).
5. Hearings on the Pennsylvania Plan for Privacy and Security of Criminal
History Record Information Before the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania House of
Representatives Appropriationsand Judiciary Comm., at 10-11, November 4-5, 1976.
6. Id. at 288.
7. Id. at 224.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss6/4

2

Beaser: Computerized Criminal Justice Information Systems: A Recognition

1174

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

22: p. 1171

Despite the position adopted by Pennsylvania state government,
the question of whether to computerize information in a criminal
justice information system will continue to be debated throughout
Pennsylvania and the rest of the nation. There is always concern
that policies of one Governor may be changed by his or her successor
and computer system guidelines may be amended in the future. Also,
as automated data processing technology becomes more sophisticated, and perhaps less expensive, additional governmental bodies
will confront the question of whether to computerize criminal justice
information. In addressing this question, a number of difficult policy
issues must be faced.
One such issue is, in the words of Professor George B. Trubow of
the John Marshall Law School, the problem of "aggregated data."8
As Professor Trubow has stated:
The question is, does the mere fact of collecting information and
marshalling it into a profile or "dossiere" change the nature of
the information itself? It has been argued that since the
ordinary criminal record is merely a compendium of separate
public records established over a period of time, the mere fact of
compilation makes no difference, and the compilation should be
as accessible as were any of the entries at their respective point
in time. That argument begs the question. Policy analysis is
needed to clarify what, if any, impact arises from the action of
government or anyone else in gathering into one place a series of
possibly related but disjointed public happenings or events.9
The capabilities of today's computers, not only to aggregate vast
amounts of data but also to sort and cross-correlate this material,
can change the fundamental nature of much of that information.
With computer technology, society has acquired the unprecedented
ability to take information which once was in an unusable or barely
usable form and make it instantly accessible. 10 Access to unusable or
barely usable information is fundamentally different from access to
easily accessible and usable data.
As in many other areas of our lives, the advent of advanced
computer technology has made a major change in the potential of
8. Trubow, Informational Privacy and the Policy Foundations for Criminal
Justice Information Management, Advisory Bulletin No. 3, SEARCH Group, Inc.,
Sacramento, Cal., 35-38 (1976).
9. Id. at 38.
10. Cf. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challange of a New
Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 1089 (1969): "With
considerable justification, modern information-transfer networks have been described
as a global electronic equivalent of the biological central nervous system because of
their unprecedented ability to create awareness and responsiveness to human
problems, and to provide a massive store of information subject to instant recall." Id.
at 1245.
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criminal justice information systems. In the past, these systems'
capacity to collect, store and disseminate information was limited.
Their inefficiency has always been one of the chief protections of
individual privacy."
Former United States Senator Sam Ervin has referred to this as
12
the "benign inefficiency of . . . file-drawer record systems".

Senator Ervin has observed:
Until very recently, significant amounts of information were
not collected about individuals and therefore were not available
to others. Use of information collected and kept on a decentralized basis is slow, inefficient and frustrating. It requires an
immense effort to collect information on a specific individual
from a variety of different agencies, and then to have it sent out
to the agency requesting it ...
This decentralization, of course, is being radically changed
by computerization and remote access through data networks.' 3
Also, computers are able to provide information in different
forms than were previously available. 4 A computer-prepared
dossier, pulling together information culled from thousands or
millions of documents or transactions is much more than the sum of

its data bits.
The computer's capacity to aggregate data, whether one looks at
it as an ability to create new information or to transform heretofore
unusable facts into useful information, must be carefully considered
when deciding what to computerize or even, when something is
computerized, whether certain persons should have access to it. It is
11. See Hearings on Criminal Justice Data Banks Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 147
(1974) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. J89/2: C86/13/974 v.1) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
The then Attorney General William B. Saxbe testified:
In the past a criminal justice agency's capacity to collect, store and
disseminate data was limited. Most systems were manual in nature and the very
inefficiency of these systems was one of the chief protections of individual
privacy, even recognizing that these manual systems were difficult to update and
contained inaccurate information which was sometimes used to the detriment of
the individual.
The scattering of data and files and the inefficient means for accessing data
all served to reduce the scope and effectivenss of pre-computer information
systems. The widespread use of computers and sophisticated interstate
transmission networks, including potential satellite transmission for connecting
these computers, has removed much of the protection the inefficiency of previous
systems may have provided to personal privacy.
Id.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id. See Miller, supra note 10, at 1109.
14. Cf. Security and Privacy Considerations in Criminal History Information
Systems, Technical Report No. 2, SEARCH Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal. (1970)
which stated that "a computerized file can be quickly searched by whatever data
elements it contains, such that compilations of subjects can be prepared with respect
to certain characteristics contained in the file." Id. at 6.
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too simplistic to state: "X" had access to the underlying, not
particularly useful data, therefore "X" should have automatic access
to the highly useful computerized information.
This ability of automated equipment to aggregate data, can lead
to potential abuses and invasions of privacy. One example of this
potential for abuse occurred early in 1973. At that time Pennsylvania state officials learned that the federal government was
instituting a data collection system called CODAP - "Client
Oriented Data Acquisition Process."' 5 Under CODAP, all drug
programs in the United States would have been forced to supply for
the federal government's computers - including criminal justice
computers - enough information to construct something called a
"unique identifier" of each patient.
As the name implies, this "unique identifier" is a means by
which data from an individual may be identified as coming from
that person. The name of the person would not be used, but the
various data elements, we were told by our computer experts, could
identify a person as indelibly as a fingerprint.
In addition, another program was simultaneously being put into
effect. This was called DAWN - "Drug Abuse Warning Network."
Using the same "unique identifier" as CODAP, this program would
have resulted in surveillance from birth to death of persons with
drug problems. DAWN was to be put into place in all hospital
emergency rooms, for all hospital inpatients, at crisis intervention
centers, and even at all medical examiners' and coroners' offices.
Any patient who showed any signs of drug abuse, or admitted to
drug abuse, would find himself or herself with a lifetime federal drug
abuse record.
Members of Governor Shapp's administration became increasingly alarmed, especially when it was discovered that the federal
government was planning to establish a national registry to trace
drug abusers anywhere in the United States.
As a result of action by Pennsylvania, together with Massachusetts, the two systems were changed so that all information which
could identify an individual was deleted.
15. The testimony of David Selig, the then Director of the Dangerous Drugs
Advisory Commission for the state of Illinois before the Senate Judiciary Committee
in 1974 characterizes the program's potential impact on confidentiality as
the encroaching Federal policy of tying Federal funding to the release of
confidential

information by the states to the Federal agency .... It is

happening more and more. Specifically, in my area, where the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare [is] requiring information on CODAP. Now they
have another title, that if you want Federal money to fight drug abuse you are
going to have to give confidential information. It is causing problems and it is
burgeoning into other areas.
1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 290.
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If the system, as originally conceived, had become effective,
individuals who innocently had gone to treatment centers with a
medical problem 16 would have been branded for life as drug abusers.
Otherwise inaccessible information would have been made easily
available by use of advanced technology.-The computer's potential to
aggregate otherwise not readily accessible data could have resulted
in abuses affecting many citizens.1 7
Computerization of information by criminal justice agencies is
not a problem which can be ignored. In many areas decisionmakers
in the criminal justice system must answer the practical question of
whether or not to utilize the tremendous speed and memory of
today's computer technology1 8 to store and to retrieve information.
The policy considerations are not one sided. As is ordinarily the
case when our society faces legitimate, antagonistic policy questions,
there must be a balance of these interests.1 9 As former United States
Attorney General Elliot Richardson has noted:
Philosophically, the problem can be stated quite simply. On
the one hand, we must be concerned about social order; on the
other we must be concerned about individual liberty and/or
autonomy. However, the balance between these two guiding
principles is always hard to strike in our society because of our
ethical and Constitutional commitment to their interdependence.20
There are three main interests which must be balanced in
discussing whether to computerize information of the types discussed here today. The first interest is each individual's right of
16. The Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act, P.L. 221, No. 1972-63
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 1690.101-.115 (Supp. 1977-78)). The act declares
that "[dlrug and alcohol abuse or dependence shall be regarded as a health problem,
sickness, physical and mental illness, disease, disability, or similar term, for purposes
of all legislation relating to health, welfare, and rehabilitation programs, services,
funds and other benefits." Id. § 1690.110.
17. Cf. 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 290.
18. Senator Barry Goldwater has testified that
Revolutionary changes in data storage have taken place or are imminent.
Computer storage devices now exist which make it entirely practicable to record
thousands of millions of characters of information, and to have the whole of this
always available for instant retrieval.
For example, the National Academy of Sciences reported in 1972: "That it is
technologically possible today, especially with recent advances in mass storage
memories, to build a computerized on-line file containing the compacted
equivalent of 20 pages of typed information about the personal history and
selected activities of every man, woman, and child in the United States,
arranging the system so that any single record could be retrieved in about 30
seconds."
1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 140 (footnote omitted).
19. 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 174. But cf. Emerson, Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1,21.
20. 1974 Hearings, supra note 11, at 174.
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privacy.2 I A second interest is the public's right to know what its
government is doing. 22 The third interest is the generalized interest
23
of the people in having an effective and efficient government.
As in most areas involving individual rights, especially the right
of privacy, there is substantial tension between the competing policy
issues. Former United States Deputy Attorney General Harold R.
Tyler, Jr., has observed this conflict in a slightly more limited
context as follows:
All legislation designed to protect individual rights of
privacy involves a tension between the public's right to know
and the individual's right to preserve a certain zone of privacy
into which the public cannot intrude. .

.

. If records of arrest,

court proceedings, and correctional decisions are not publicly
available, then the public is not only generally uninformed
about its criminal justice process, but individuals risk all of the
21. In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
Justice Brandeis referred to the "right to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Though the right to privacy has
been described as being "a notion of formidible obscurity," 1974 Hearings,supra note
11, at 439, it certainly has grown into an important, constitutionally based liberty. As
was noted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line
of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as 1891, the Court has
recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas oi
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the
Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in
the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; in the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. These decisions
make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy.
Id. 152-53 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv.L. REV. 193 (1890); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy:Repose, Sanctuary, and
Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1147 (1976); The Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen.
Committee on the Office of the Attorney Gen., Privacy:PersonalData and the Law,
Raleigh, N. C. (Nov., 1976).
22. This right was acknowledged from the outset: "A popular government,
without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce
or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people
who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge
gives." Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed. 1910). See Emerson, supra note 19; Nat'l Ass'n of
Attorneys Gen., supra note 21 at 8.
23. It has been noted that
[t]here are other interests, however, which must be considered in determining the
weight of a particular claim of privacy. All individuals in the society share an
interest in an effective government. The government's need to obtain information about individuals in order to formulate and implement its policies may
outweigh the individual's interest in disclosural privacy.
Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., supra note 21, at 7.
Economic factors may also be a consideration because there is also an interest
in having an efficient government. But the decision to computerize should not be
made merely because it is economically feasible or even less expensive to utilize
computer technology. See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
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dangers inherent in secret arrests, Star Chamber proceedings,
and banishment to secret prisons. Yet if a past error, already
paid for, can follow an individual for the rest of his life,
threatening his employment opportunities and his acceptance in
the community, our hopes of rehabilitating offenders through
improved correctional services are impeded. 24
As Pound put it, this situation is "one of compromise; of
balancing conflicting interests and securing as much as may be with
25
the least sacrifice of other interests."
In weighing the competing interests, there are very real dangers
inherent in criminal justice agencies' computerizing of sensitive
information, such as medical records, a person's association with
other persons or groups and so on. "While advances in technology
contribute to more effective and efficient law enforcement, they also
greatly increase the opportunity for abuses. ' 26
In the decisionmaking process concerning whether to place
information in a computerized criminal justice information system,
those who propose such computerization should bear a clear burden
of showing that such computerization is necessary and that the
balance of interests should be tipped in favor of computerized
27
recordkeeping.
This computerization burden should extend individually to each
data element. Every item of information collected about people and
fed into a criminal justice system computer should require justification. 28 We cannot permit the collection of data in automated criminal
24. Hearings on H.R. 8227 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1975) (Sup. Doc.
No. Y4.J89/1: 94-68) (Statement of Deputy Attorney Gen. Harold R. Tyler).

25. R. Pound, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
HARV. J. LEGIS. at 24 (1976).

AMERICAN CITY 18 (1922), cited in 14

With regard to the "clash between the right of privacy and the right to know"
Professor Thomas I. Emerson suggests that "ad hoc balancing" is the "least useful
path to follow." Emerson, supra note 19, at 21. While admitting that "some element of
balancing would probably be found in any test," Professor Emerson would solve any
such conflict by giving precedence to the right of privacy. Id. at 22. With regard to
computerized criminal justice information systems, the proposed "computerization
burden," while not giving complete precedence to the right of privacy does weigh the
scales in privacy's favor. See text accompanying notes 27-31, infra.
26. Cooper and Zehner, Privacy: The Evolution of an Issue, Advisory Bulletin No.

3, SEARCH Group, Inc. 1, 19 (1976).
27. Whether certain information should be collected at all is another issue
altogether. The question here is only whether information of a sensitive nature should
be computerized.

28. Cf. Miller, supra note 10, at 1214 wherein the author stated:
[I]f informational privacy is to be protected, it is crucial to screen data
initially to prevent some of it from being placed in the system.
Extremely sensitive personal information -

for example, records of mental

illness, or inherently "soft" data, such as psychological test results - normally
should be excluded from large multiaccess systems even if the files customarily
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justice information systems just because excess computer capacity
exists.
The interlocking of computer banks should require similar, if not
stronger, justification. Information stored in one computer becomes
even more usable, and subject to abuse, when it can be correlated
with data contained in other computer systems. Then too, the
interlocking of computer banks can increase the very real potential
for dissemination of inaccurate information. Indeed, the ease of
disseminating inaccurate data is one of the great potential hazards
to be faced when information is fed into a computer.
The concept of a "computerization burden" should not be
29
construed as being antitechnology or against the use of technology.
The societal interest in an efficient and effective criminal justice
system is strong and technological developments in appropriate
cases can assist in improving the system. But this interest must
always be weighed against the very real dangers to individual
privacy from the use of this same technology 0
The "computerization burden" approach can be used by decision
makers in resolving conflicts between the competing interests. This
is the type of analysis which the Governor's Task Force on Criminal
Justice Information Systems used in making the decision not to
computerize the Pennsylvania State Police's criminal history record
31
files.
In discussing what data is to be computerized in a large,
multiagency criminal justice information system, a balance must be
reached between the competing interests, with the proponents of
computerization clearly bearing the computerization burden.
The debate concerning the right of privacy, the public's right to
know, and the needs of government for greater efficiency, will
continue and is healthy for our society. The ability to collect, collate
and disseminate data has so increased as to make the world of 1984,
as envisioned by George Orwell, a present day possibility.
are stored in a secure area removed from the central processor. Unless there is
some definable and compelling reason to include this type of information in a

multiaccess system, every effort should be taken to keep it out of the information
flow.
Id. (citation ommitted).
29. In his book, DOSSIER (1974), Areyh Neier observed that "[c]omputerization

makes consolidation of information far easier than is possible if each of the recordmaintaining agencies does its work manually." Id. at 162. However, he states that
computers are not "the villian" since "the two largest and most harmful data banks"
he examines are both "old-fashioned manually operated systems." Id.
30. See Miller, supra note 10, at 1173-74.
31. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
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